What's with gold? The Bigger Picture - - -

The titular price of gold dropped about $84 dollars on Friday, April 12, 2013 in an obviously unprecedented manner. Yet, at the same time, ABN AMRO, one of the largest banks in Europe, failed to deliver the PHYSICAL gold it had contracted to deliver and defaulted, Venezuela, Germany, and apparently the Netherlands are repatriating their gold from the U.S. Fed -- and the U.S. Mint has periodically suspended sales of precious coins because of a lack of metal to cast them with.

SOMETHING is going on. Maybe it's just a normal trashing of the gold price by the government-banking axis, but to an extreme degree.

The question is, "Why NOW?"

Hopefully the answer is, "Because we've been trying to do this to protect our Keynesian zero-real-interest-rates against gold ever since it hit $1900/oz and threatened them -- and just NOW all the factors were finally right." Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Paul Craig Roberts thinks this is the case.

That's most likely.

BUT if the answer is, "We see a serious ripple in the fiat force, and we're trying to head the disaster off at the pass," they may be right. Worse, their blatantly obvious action against gold may precipitate the very disaster they fear and perhaps are even semi-aware of from history.

In that case, here's what that would likely look like - - - My Blog Former U.S. Under Secretary of Treasury Paul Craig Roberts explains what the bankster-government axis may be worried about.

According to veteran metals trader Andrew McGuire, the western banking-government amalgam, spearheaded as usual by Bankster Goldman Sachs, dumped more than an unheard of 500 tons of PAPER gold on the market late last week. And pimped, cajoled, and forced other weak hands to play along.

What's paper have to do with it? "Paper gold" merely means it was promises to deliver gold, not gold itself. Which is what makes the failure of ABN AMRO to deliver promised gold very interesting indeed.

It's directly analagous to the beginning of an old fashioned run on a bank where the bank was unable to redeem its "Redeemable in Gold on Demand" dollars -- the only Constitutional kind -- because they'd printed those redeemable I.O.U.s for more gold than they actually had. If anyone else had done that, it would be called "counterfeiting."

And because the banks are so interconnected, this isn't just a run on ABN AMRO.

AND maybe the repatriation movement, besides being interesting, is the straw that lit the fuse as Venezuela, Gremany, probably Holland, and perhaps some other countries are repatriating their gold which has been theoretically stored in the valuts beneath the Federal Resreve Bank of New York -- made famous in Die Hard With a Vengeance, the third in the series.

History? That was when France, a few other countries, and most importantly, the markets, called Uncle Scam's Bretton-Woods "London Gold Pool" paper-gold bluff by taking delivery of actual physical gold from the U.S. and its other eight dragooned central banks. In stupidly trying to again raise the market bet and cap the price of gold, Uncle airlifted a bunch of gold to London, ultimately collapsing the floor of one storage vault. But that was all to no avail. Being caught with its counterfeit shorts down, finally, on August 15, 1971, with Executive Order 11615, Nixon "closed the gold window," thus abrogating the international convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold and finalizing the biggest default in history. So far.

P.S. As of April 14, 2013, 22:57, it looks like Goldman et.al. are still working the plan. Be interesting to see just how far they can go before the markets once again slap them upside the head.

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ECONOMICS IN ONE EASY LESSON

Economics is simpler than you think -- if you're an Austrian Economist (Hayek, Mises, etc.) rather than a Keynesian Economist (J.M. Keynes), monetarist (Milton Friedman), neo-Keynesian economist (Bernanke, Krugman, etc.).

1. The "law of supply and demand" applies to "money."

2. An increase in the "money" supply greater than the increase in production -- because of the law of supply and demand -- causes a general price inflation across the boards.

3. Credit (I.O.U.s of various types, including stock certificates, bonds, etc. -- that note on the back of granddad's cigarette pack), as Daniel Webster put it, is equivalent to "money" and has all the effects of "money."

3A. Most I.O.U.s start out as limited circulation I.O.U.s -- and stay that way unless a market is established which allows them to be traded, that is, makes them "liquid."

4. A sudden change in the amount of either "money" or credit -- in either direction -- disrupts trade and thus the advantages of specialization and division of labor -- which ultimately determine the physical level of well-being of the human race -- and make the "modern" large populations possible.

5. Without the advantages of trade (and thus division of labor), extremely large numbers of men, women and children would die.

6. Barring the crash of a solid gold or silver asteroid, a sudden change in the supply of gold and silver (transactional hard money) are highly unlikely.

7. Because their value depends on psychology rather on a directly perceived value of a strictly limited physical commodity, the effective supply of both credit and paper/megabyte money can change suddenly.

8. The supply of both credit and paper/megabyte money CAN change with extreme rapidity, paper/megabyte because it's easy to create, credit because it completely depends on confidence that the debtor can and will pay, and without that confidence, a credit vehicle becomes devalued or even worthless. That is, because people can lose confidence in an I.O.U. and so don't want it, it becomes less, or even completely, "illiquid." That is, "people don't want it" = "illiquid" = "devalued" or even "worthless."

9. Since most people hold money for later use, at least partially, it's important that people have confidence it will hold its trade value and NOT devalue. Thus, the main "psychology" that determines whether or not people will hold a particular I.O.U. is their expectation as to its future value. If they expect its value to drop -- or equivalently, expect prices to rise -- they will spend it quickly. That is, if they expect a general price inflation, they will lose confidence in their money and spend it quickly.

10. Once people in general start to spend quickly, this puts more money into circulation quickly, thus increasing its effective supply, which causes more inflation, more inflationary expectations, destroys more confidence, and so forth. The Austrian School of economics calls the rapid spiral that results a "crack-up boom" or "catastrophenhause." Others call it "hyperinflation." Which is why U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Bernanke and the FED are so concerned by peoples' "inflationary expectations." This is, of course, not a problem with transactional hard money -- which, barring that solid-gold asteroid, can't suddenly inflate -- or suddenly deflate.

Just another I.O.U.

There's always a discount on an I.O.U. The amount depends on its perceived likely-hood of being paid. The dollar is, in essence, such an I.O.U. The perception of repayment is dropping and you can follow it by watching the value of dollars on the market. --L. Reichard White, Thursday, November 11, 2010 3:22 AM

Out of Greece: The dynamics of contagion

"As I testified before this committee in the midst of the Mexican financial crisis in early 1995, major advances in technology have engendered a highly efficient and increasingly sophisticated international financial system. ...But that same efficient financial system, as I also pointed out in that earlier testimony, has the capability to rapidly transmit the consequences of errors of judgement in private investments and public policies to all corners of the world at historically unprecedented speeds." -Alan Greenspan to House Banking Committee, 16 September, 1998.  --BIG-FLOAT: The American Damocles

How inflation led to totalitarianism in Rome

The episodes of extreme inflation took a standard form. ... The government ...resorted to debasing the coins of the realm. This took the form of replacing the gold and silver in coins with copper and other cheaper metals. Over the period 218 to 268 A.D. the silver content of Roman coins dropped to one five thousandth of its original level. Sometimes the size and weight of coins were reduced. It also meant vastly increasing the amount of coins in circulation. There was a corresponding increase in prices. The emperors usually blamed the price increases on the greed of merchants. ... In 301 AD Diocletian issued an edict declaring fixed prices; i.e., price controls. His edict provided for the death penalty for anyone selling above the control prices. There was also penalties (less severe) for anyone paying more than the control price. Irate consumers sometimes destroyed the businesses of those who sold higher than the control prices. In the short-run these draconian measures may have curbed inflation but in the long-run the results were disaster. Merchants stopped selling goods but this led to penalties against hoarding. People went out of business but Diocletian countered with laws saying that every man had to pursue the occupation of their father. The penalty for not doing so was death. This was justified on the basis that leaving the occupation of ones father was like a soldier deserting in time of war. The effect of this was to turn free men into serfs.   EPISODES OF HYPERINFLATION, Thayer Watkins, ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY